Activity for Chgg Clou
| Type | On... | Excerpt | Status | Date |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Question | — |
How does Pr(an event next year) $= 1/100$ imply Pr(at least one of these events occurring in the next 25 years) $> 1/5$? Please see the embolden phrase below. It appears to equalize, or at least relate, Pr(an event next year) $= 1/100$, with Pr(at least one of these events occurring in the next 25 years) $> 1/5$? But the former is an equality, whilst the latter an inequality? > Turning to other e... (more) |
— | almost 3 years ago |
| Edit | Post #282060 |
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— | almost 3 years ago |
| Edit | Post #282060 | Initial revision | — | almost 3 years ago |
| Question | — |
Why isn't $\Pr(diseased|+ test) = \dfrac{\text{number of true positives}}{\text{number of false positives}}$? 1. Technically, the $\color{red}{10}$ quoted below should be 9.99, because $1% \times 999 = 9.99%$. Anyways, why $\Pr(diseased|+ test) = \dfrac{1 \text{ true positive}}{9.9 \text{ false positives} + \color{limegreen}{1 \text{ true positive}}}$? Why isn't $\Pr(diseased|+ test) = \dfrac{1 \text{ t... (more) |
— | almost 3 years ago |
| Comment | Post #282038 |
"Then married > smokers, but now married smokers / married people is 10%, and all smokers / all people is 20% (check this yourself)." Can you please show the steps? Married smokers/married people = 10%/50% = 20%, but you wrote "10%"? "all smokers / all people" = (10% + 30%)/all people. But what numbe... (more) |
— | almost 3 years ago |
| Comment | Post #282038 |
Hi! Thanks for your replies! "I wonder if you meant to write married smokers < all smokers," No I didn't. The author's sentence is "To say that marital status and smoking status are negatively correlated, for example, is simply to say that **married people [emphasis mine]** are less likely than the *... (more) |
— | almost 3 years ago |
| Edit | Post #282056 | Initial revision | — | almost 3 years ago |
| Question | — |
What does "individuals discount the future in a constant manner" mean? 1. Is the embold phrase referring to Present Value? 2. But how does Present Value relate to the example below with the "online bookstore"? >### AMBIGUITY AND THE FUTURE >Up to now, I’ve said little about how timing affects our reaction to uncertainty. For many decision problems we do not kn... (more) |
— | almost 3 years ago |
| Edit | Post #282055 | Initial revision | — | almost 3 years ago |
| Question | — |
How's the outcome of airplane crashes almost always certain, but the probability is not? Please see the bolden phrase and Table 12.1 below. For plane crashes, did the author mix up which (probability or outcome) is ambiguous, and which is precise? 1. Isn't the outcome of airplane crashes AMBIGUOUS? Because they aren't fatal? But the author wrote "almost always certain". And in Tab... (more) |
— | almost 3 years ago |
| Edit | Post #282049 |
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— | almost 3 years ago |
| Edit | Post #282052 | Initial revision | — | almost 3 years ago |
| Question | — |
If money's less valuable in the two-bullet case of the Russian Roulette problem, then ought you pay more to remove a bullet when the gun has $\ge 2$ bullets? The emboldened sentences feel contradictory. On one hand, "they are equal reductions in the probability of death". On the other, "money is less valuable in the two-bullet case since they are 1/6 likely to die anyway". What does this imply for the two-bullet case? Ouoght you pay more to remove a bulle... (more) |
— | almost 3 years ago |
| Edit | Post #282051 |
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— | almost 3 years ago |
| Edit | Post #282051 | Initial revision | — | almost 3 years ago |
| Question | — |
Why should the near-zero prior probability, of 9/11/2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre, overwhelm any subsequent response that may have lowered the objective risk? Can you please expound the embold phrase below? Can this be calculated? > It is notoriously difficult, however, to assess what one’s prior assessment of the risk would have been had one thought of the event before it actually occurred. Most Americans had never contemplated th... (more) |
— | almost 3 years ago |
| Edit | Post #282049 |
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— | almost 3 years ago |
| Edit | Post #282049 | Initial revision | — | almost 3 years ago |
| Question | — |
Why paradoxical to accept \$3, and avoid betting on Dushanbe's temperature for a prize of \$10? If you don't know Dushanbe's past or historical temperatures, then isn't it rational to accept the $3 for sure? It doesn't feel rational to bet whether the temperature's low or high in Dushanbe, when you have no clue which side is more probable. I don't understand why there's a paradox. If you kn... (more) |
— | almost 3 years ago |
| Edit | Post #282046 |
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— | almost 3 years ago |
| Edit | Post #282047 | Initial revision | — | almost 3 years ago |
| Question | — |
Why's the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium, that the first player should offer around $1.25 to player 2? Please see the bolden phrase below. Let's abbreviate player $j$ to $Pj$. Even if this is the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium, it feels unnecessarily risky and irrational to me. Why wouldn't you simply offer $2.5 (50% of 5) to P2? You don't know if P2 is rational, reasonable, or sane. I can't ... (more) |
— | almost 3 years ago |
| Edit | Post #282046 | Initial revision | — | almost 3 years ago |
| Question | — |
Why rational to be indifferent between two urns, when urn A has 50-50 red and white balls, but you don't know urn B's ratio? Please see the embolden sentence below. Assume that I'm risk adverse and "prefer the known chance over the unknown". Why's it irrational for me to choose A? > Also, there were problems on the probability side. One famous debate concerned a paradox posed by Daniel Ellsberg (of l... (more) |
— | almost 3 years ago |
| Edit | Post #282031 |
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— | almost 3 years ago |
| Edit | Post #282031 |
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— | almost 3 years ago |
| Edit | Post #282031 | Initial revision | — | almost 3 years ago |
| Question | — |
Why are you permitted to define $1 − 1 + 1 − 1 + . . .$? Please see the embold phrase below. Why doesn't $1 − 1 + 1 − 1 + . . .$ possess an intrinsic, Platonic objective meaning? The best way to showcase my confusion, is to burlesque the Riemann Hypothesis. If Hardy and humans can simply define $1 − 1 + 1 − 1 + . . .$, why not just define $\zeta(s)=\sum{... (more) |
— | almost 3 years ago |
| Edit | Post #282020 | Initial revision | — | almost 3 years ago |
| Question | — |
What was Justice Scalia's mathematical mistake in Penry v. Lynaugh (1989)? Please see the bolden phrase below. Please don't hesitate to reduce the amount of quotation, which I know is lengthy, whilst preserving enough context. > But even granting this point, Scalia writes, state legislatures have not demonstrated a national consensus against executi... (more) |
— | almost 3 years ago |
| Edit | Post #282016 | Initial revision | — | almost 3 years ago |
| Question | — |
Why mustn't the proportion of smokers among married people be the same as the proportion of smokers in the whole population? Please see the embolded phrase below. When I read this for the first time, I didn't see this problem at all, and this problem didn't present itself immediately to me. After rereading this four times, I still don't understand this immediate problem! > If you multiply both sides ... (more) |
— | almost 3 years ago |
| Edit | Post #282015 | Initial revision | — | almost 3 years ago |
| Question | — |
How to intuit : married smokers × all people < all smokers × all married people ? How can I intuit inequality (3) in my previous post? The author intuits inequalities (1) and (2), but not (3). Scilicet, how can you explain inequality (3) to a 10 year old? I can't intuit the meaning of multiplying smokers $\times$ people! > If you multiply both sides of ... (more) |
— | almost 3 years ago |
| Edit | Post #282014 | Initial revision | — | almost 3 years ago |
| Question | — |
How to quantify "married people are less likely than the average person to smoke", "smokers are less likely than the average person to be married"? When I first saw inequalities (1) and (2) below, I quantified them as: $\color{red}{\text{1.1. married people When you’re comparing two binary variables, correlation takes on a particularly simple form. To say that marital status and smoking status are negatively correlated,... (more) |
— | almost 3 years ago |
| Edit | Post #282013 |
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— | almost 3 years ago |
| Edit | Post #282013 | Initial revision | — | almost 3 years ago |
| Question | — |
Why do 3D mental pictures usually suffice for high-dimensional geometry? Kindly see the embolded phrases below. The author doesn't expound why the 3D "mental pictures" are "usually enough". Scilicet, why doesn't "this impoverished vision" hinder high-dimensional geometry, or at least deprive or forestall you from learning all about it? > In the sam... (more) |
— | almost 3 years ago |
| Edit | Post #282012 | Initial revision | — | almost 3 years ago |
| Question | — |
How can you foretell if a problem is one whose solution admits a simple mathematical description? Kindly see the emboldened phrase below. What kind of problems is the author referring to? >### THE UNREASONABLE EFFECTIVENESS OF CLASSICAL GEOMETRY > For Apollonius and the Greek geometers, ellipses were conic sections: surfaces obtained by slicing a cone along a plane. ... (more) |
— | almost 3 years ago |
| Edit | Post #281008 | Initial revision | — | about 3 years ago |
| Question | — |
If a repair on a vessel costs $2$ and fully repaired vessel is worth $1$, don't we need know worth of broken vessel to decide whether to repair? I divided all prices by 100,000 to simplify the question. The book beneath doesn't stipulate the current value of the vessel. But don't we need to know it, to calculate if it's worth repairing? How do we prove that regardless of the vessel's current cost, the vessel not worth repair? McKendrick. ... (more) |
— | about 3 years ago |
| Edit | Post #281007 | Initial revision | — | about 3 years ago |
| Question | — |
What kind of logic does “Logic in the Theory and Practice of Lawmaking” employ? I stumbled on 2016 Springer book Logic in the Theory and Practice of Lawmaking. I was curious and leafed through. >  1. What kind of logic is this? I scanned just the pages with the most logic symbols. 2. What level and s... (more) |
— | about 3 years ago |
| Edit | Post #281006 | Initial revision | — | about 3 years ago |
| Question | — |
In "if and only if" proofs, why's 1 direction easier to prove than the other? This list on Math StackExchange instantiates (biconditional) logical equivalences where one direction can be proved swimmingly, but the other direction is racking to prove. If two propositions are equivalent, why can't they be proved with the same level of difficulty? Please don't troll with frivo... (more) |
— | about 3 years ago |
| Edit | Post #281005 | Initial revision | — | about 3 years ago |
| Question | — |
Intuitively, why's X% of Y = Y% of X? I didn't spot this trick until I read this: >LPT: X percent of Y is equal to Y percent of X. > I know that multiplication is commutative. Indubitably, $\dfrac{X}{100}Y= X\dfrac{Y}{100}$ But this algebra doesn't betray the intuition! How can this be intuited? (more) |
— | about 3 years ago |
| Edit | Post #280850 | Initial revision | — | about 3 years ago |