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#3: Post edited by user avatar Peter Taylor‭ · 2023-05-10T14:58:43Z (12 months ago)
Remove non-mathematical content and inappropriate use of mathematical markup which reduces the accessibility of the question
  • 1. Are there official terms for these 2 different interpretations of the same statistic?
  • 2. Which way is wrong? If both are correct, which way is better? What are the pros and cons of each construal? I added the colors.
  • >Lord Hoffmann and Baroness Hale advanced the following arguments against awarding
  • damages for the pure loss of a chance of being cured:
  • >
  • >(1) The _Hotson_<sup>82</sup> problem. In cases such as _Gregg v Scott_, it may well be that the claimant
  • never had a chance of being cured, and if this is the case it would be inappropriate to
  • award him damages on the basis that his doctor’s negligence deprived him of a chance of
  • being ‘cured’.<sup>83</sup> **The statisticians tell us that of 100 patients presenting with a lump like
  • the claimant’s in _Gregg v Scott_, 42 will be ‘cured’ if they are treated immediately. [emphasis mine]** $\color{limegreen}{\text{One way of interpreting this statistic is to say that each of those 100 patients has a 42 per cent chance of being ‘cured’.}}$ If this is right, then it would be correct to say that the claimant
  • in _Gregg v Scott_ had a 42 per cent chance of being ‘cured’ when he saw the defendant
  • doctor. $\color{red}{\text{But there is a different way of reading the statistics.}}$ It may be that of 100 patients
  • presenting with a lump like the claimant’s in _Gregg v Scott_, the varying genetic make-ups
  • of the 100 patients mean that 42 of them are certain to be ‘cured’ so long as the lump is
  • treated immediately, and 58 of them have no chance of being ‘cured’ no matter how much
  • treatment they receive. If this is right, then it was more likely than not that the claimant
  • in _Gregg v Scott_ had _no chance_ of being ‘cured’ and it would therefore be inappropriate to
  • award him damages on the basis that he did have a chance of being cured.
  • >
  • ><sup>82</sup> See above, § 8.6.
  • <sup>83</sup> _Gregg_, at [79]–[81] (per Lord Hoffmann).
  • N.J. McBride and R. Bagshaw, *Tort Law*, 6th edn (2018), page 285.
  • Are there official terms for these 2 different interpretations of the same statistic?
  • >Lord Hoffmann and Baroness Hale advanced the following arguments against awarding
  • damages for the pure loss of a chance of being cured:
  • >
  • >(1) The _Hotson_<sup>82</sup> problem. In cases such as _Gregg v Scott_, it may well be that the claimant
  • never had a chance of being cured, and if this is the case it would be inappropriate to
  • award him damages on the basis that his doctor’s negligence deprived him of a chance of
  • being ‘cured’.<sup>83</sup> **The statisticians tell us that of 100 patients presenting with a lump like
  • the claimant’s in _Gregg v Scott_, 42 will be ‘cured’ if they are treated immediately. [emphasis mine]** One way of interpreting this statistic is to say that each of those 100 patients has a 42 per cent chance of being ‘cured’. If this is right, then it would be correct to say that the claimant
  • in _Gregg v Scott_ had a 42 per cent chance of being ‘cured’ when he saw the defendant
  • doctor. But there is a different way of reading the statistics. It may be that of 100 patients
  • presenting with a lump like the claimant’s in _Gregg v Scott_, the varying genetic make-ups
  • of the 100 patients mean that 42 of them are certain to be ‘cured’ so long as the lump is
  • treated immediately, and 58 of them have no chance of being ‘cured’ no matter how much
  • treatment they receive. If this is right, then it was more likely than not that the claimant
  • in _Gregg v Scott_ had _no chance_ of being ‘cured’ and it would therefore be inappropriate to
  • award him damages on the basis that he did have a chance of being cured.
  • >
  • ><sup>82</sup> See above, § 8.6.
  • <sup>83</sup> _Gregg_, at [79]–[81] (per Lord Hoffmann).
  • N.J. McBride and R. Bagshaw, *Tort Law*, 6th edn (2018), page 285.
#2: Post edited by user avatar DNB‭ · 2023-05-10T07:09:12Z (12 months ago)
  • 1. Are there official terms for these 2 different construals of the same statistic?
  • 2. Which way is wrong? If both are correct, which way is better? What are the pros and cons of each of the 2 construals? I added the colors.
  • >Lord Hoffmann and Baroness Hale advanced the following arguments against awarding
  • damages for the pure loss of a chance of being cured:
  • >
  • >(1) The _Hotson_<sup>82</sup> problem. In cases such as _Gregg v Scott_, it may well be that the claimant
  • never had a chance of being cured, and if this is the case it would be inappropriate to
  • award him damages on the basis that his doctor’s negligence deprived him of a chance of
  • being ‘cured’.<sup>83</sup> **The statisticians tell us that of 100 patients presenting with a lump like
  • the claimant’s in _Gregg v Scott_, 42 will be ‘cured’ if they are treated immediately. [emphasis mine]** $\color{limegreen}{\text{One way of interpreting this statistic is to say that each of those 100 patients has a 42 per cent chance of being ‘cured’.}}$ If this is right, then it would be correct to say that the claimant
  • in _Gregg v Scott_ had a 42 per cent chance of being ‘cured’ when he saw the defendant
  • doctor. $\color{red}{\text{But there is a different way of reading the statistics.}}$ It may be that of 100 patients
  • presenting with a lump like the claimant’s in _Gregg v Scott_, the varying genetic make-ups
  • of the 100 patients mean that 42 of them are certain to be ‘cured’ so long as the lump is
  • treated immediately, and 58 of them have no chance of being ‘cured’ no matter how much
  • treatment they receive. If this is right, then it was more likely than not that the claimant
  • in _Gregg v Scott_ had _no chance_ of being ‘cured’ and it would therefore be inappropriate to
  • award him damages on the basis that he did have a chance of being cured.
  • >
  • ><sup>82</sup> See above, § 8.6.
  • <sup>83</sup> _Gregg_, at [79]–[81] (per Lord Hoffmann).
  • N.J. McBride and R. Bagshaw, *Tort Law*, 6th edn (2018), page 285.
  • 1. Are there official terms for these 2 different interpretations of the same statistic?
  • 2. Which way is wrong? If both are correct, which way is better? What are the pros and cons of each construal? I added the colors.
  • >Lord Hoffmann and Baroness Hale advanced the following arguments against awarding
  • damages for the pure loss of a chance of being cured:
  • >
  • >(1) The _Hotson_<sup>82</sup> problem. In cases such as _Gregg v Scott_, it may well be that the claimant
  • never had a chance of being cured, and if this is the case it would be inappropriate to
  • award him damages on the basis that his doctor’s negligence deprived him of a chance of
  • being ‘cured’.<sup>83</sup> **The statisticians tell us that of 100 patients presenting with a lump like
  • the claimant’s in _Gregg v Scott_, 42 will be ‘cured’ if they are treated immediately. [emphasis mine]** $\color{limegreen}{\text{One way of interpreting this statistic is to say that each of those 100 patients has a 42 per cent chance of being ‘cured’.}}$ If this is right, then it would be correct to say that the claimant
  • in _Gregg v Scott_ had a 42 per cent chance of being ‘cured’ when he saw the defendant
  • doctor. $\color{red}{\text{But there is a different way of reading the statistics.}}$ It may be that of 100 patients
  • presenting with a lump like the claimant’s in _Gregg v Scott_, the varying genetic make-ups
  • of the 100 patients mean that 42 of them are certain to be ‘cured’ so long as the lump is
  • treated immediately, and 58 of them have no chance of being ‘cured’ no matter how much
  • treatment they receive. If this is right, then it was more likely than not that the claimant
  • in _Gregg v Scott_ had _no chance_ of being ‘cured’ and it would therefore be inappropriate to
  • award him damages on the basis that he did have a chance of being cured.
  • >
  • ><sup>82</sup> See above, § 8.6.
  • <sup>83</sup> _Gregg_, at [79]–[81] (per Lord Hoffmann).
  • N.J. McBride and R. Bagshaw, *Tort Law*, 6th edn (2018), page 285.
#1: Initial revision by user avatar DNB‭ · 2023-05-10T07:08:27Z (12 months ago)
2 construals "of 100 patients presenting with a lump like the claimant’s in Gregg v Scott, 42 will be ‘cured’ if they are treated immediately."
1. Are there official terms for these 2 different construals of the same statistic?

2. Which way is wrong? If both are correct, which way is better? What are the pros and cons of each of the 2 construals? I added the colors.

>Lord Hoffmann and Baroness Hale advanced the following arguments against awarding
damages for the pure loss of a chance of being cured:
>
>(1) The _Hotson_<sup>82</sup> problem. In cases such as _Gregg v Scott_, it may well be that the claimant
never had a chance of being cured, and if this is the case it would be inappropriate to
award him damages on the basis that his doctor’s negligence deprived him of a chance of
being ‘cured’.<sup>83</sup> **The statisticians tell us that of 100 patients presenting with a lump like
the claimant’s in _Gregg v Scott_, 42 will be ‘cured’ if they are treated immediately. [emphasis mine]** $\color{limegreen}{\text{One way of interpreting this statistic is to say that each of those 100 patients has a 42 per cent chance of being ‘cured’.}}$  If this is right, then it would be correct to say that the claimant
in _Gregg v Scott_ had a 42 per cent chance of being ‘cured’ when he saw the defendant
doctor. $\color{red}{\text{But there is a different way of reading the statistics.}}$  It may be that of 100 patients
presenting with a lump like the claimant’s in _Gregg v Scott_, the varying genetic make-ups
of the 100 patients mean that 42 of them are certain to be ‘cured’ so long as the lump is
treated immediately, and 58 of them have no chance of being ‘cured’ no matter how much
treatment they receive. If this is right, then it was more likely than not that the claimant
in _Gregg v Scott_ had _no chance_ of being ‘cured’ and it would therefore be inappropriate to
award him damages on the basis that he did have a chance of being cured.
>
><sup>82</sup> See above, § 8.6.     
<sup>83</sup> _Gregg_, at [79]–[81] (per Lord Hoffmann).

N.J. McBride and R. Bagshaw, *Tort Law*, 6th edn (2018), page 285.