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Comments on Compactness of the Propositional Calculus

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Compactness of the Propositional Calculus

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Here is the theorem and its proof from Mathematical and Philosophical Logic from Harrie de Swart (p.35).

Let $\Gamma$ be a (possibly infinite) set of formulas such that every finite subset of $\Gamma$ has a model[1]. Then $\Gamma$ has a model.

Proof:

Let $\Gamma$ be a (possibly infinite) set of formulas such that every finite subset of $\Gamma$ has a model. We will define an interpretation $i$ of the atomic propositional formulas $P_1, P_2, P_3, \dots$ such that for every natural number $n$, $\phi(n)$, where $\phi(n)$ := "every finite subset of $\Gamma$ has a model in which $P_1, P_2, \dots, P_n$ take the values $i(P_1), i(P_2), \dots, i(P_n)$". Once having shown this, it follows that $i(A) = 1$ for every formula $A$ in $\Gamma$. For given a formula $A$ in $\Gamma$, take $n$ so large that all atomic formulas occurring in $A$ are among $P_1, \dots, P_n$. Since $\{A\}$ is a finite subset of $\Gamma$ and because of $\phi(n)$, $A$ has a model in which $P_1, \dots, P_n$ take the values $i(P_1), \dots, i(P_n)$. So, $i(A) = 1$.

Let $i(P_1) = 0$ and suppose $\phi(1)$ does not hold. That is, there is a finite subset $\Gamma'$ of $\Gamma$ which has no model in which $P_1$ takes the value $i(P_1) = 0$. Then we define $i(P_1) = 1$[2] and show that $\phi(1)$, i.e., every finite subset of $\Gamma$ has a model in which $P_1$ takes the value $i(P_1) = 1$.[3] For let $\Delta$ be a finite subset of $\Gamma$. Then $\Delta \cup \Gamma'$ is a finite subset of $\Gamma$ and hence has a model $i$. Since $i$ is a model of $\Gamma'$, $i(P_1) = 1$.

Suppose we have defined $i(P_1), \dots, i(P_n)$ such that $\phi(n)$. Then we can extend the definition of $i$ to $P_{n+1}$ such that $\phi(n + 1)$. For suppose that $\phi(n + 1)$ does not hold if $i(P_{n+1}) = 0$. That is, there is a finite subset $\Gamma'$ of $\Gamma$ which has no model in which $P_1, \dots, P_n, P_{n+1}$ take the values $i(P_1), \dots, i(P_n), 0$. Then we define $i(P_{n+1}) = 1$ and show that $\phi(n + 1)$, i.e., every finite subset of $\Gamma$ has a model in which $P_1, \dots, P_n, P_{n+1}$ take the values $i(P_1), \dots, i(P_n), 1$. For let $\Delta$ be a finite subset of $\Gamma$. Then $\Delta \cup \Gamma'$ is a finite subset of $\Gamma$ and hence, by the induction hypothesis, $\Delta \cup \Gamma'$ has a model in which $P_1, \dots, P_n$ take the values $i(P_1), \dots, i(P_n)$. Since $i$ is a model of $\Gamma'$, $i(P_{n+1}) = 1$.



  1. I understand the we have a common model for every subset Right? An interpretation corresponds to one line in the (possibly infinite) truth table of the atomic variables $P_1, \dots , P_n$ ... ↩︎

  2. I don't understand what is this new remastered definition. If $i (P_1) = 0$, that is, the true value of $P_1$ is 'False', how can I change this? And if we change it from 'False' to 'True', we can destroy the model of an other formula e g. $A = \lnot P_1$. ↩︎

  3. Note. Maybe I am beginning to understand. "If $i (P_1) = 0$, and if $\phi(1)$ does not hold" means that when the Truth Value 0 is assigned to $i(P_1)$,and the set $\Gamma$ has no model. That is, necessarily almost a part of it, that is, a subset $\Gamma'$ of formulas that hold the Truth Value 0 because of as a consequence of the value of $i(P_1)$. So for a good model, we decide to attribute the value 1 to $i(P_1)$.

    I was expecting something as this. Say we have only $P_1$ and $P_2$ and formulas that are true when $P_1$ is false and $P_2$ is true. One subset is $\Gamma_1 = \{ P_1 \land P_2, P_2 \land P_1\}$, another is $\Gamma_2 = \{P_1 \to P_2, \lnot P_2 \to P_1\}$, another is $\Gamma_3 = \{\lnot P_1\}$. If $\Gamma$ contains a formula that is false under our interpretation, such as $P_1$, there is nothing to do, $\Gamma$ has no model, because if $P_1$ turns to be true, then $\Gamma_3$ has no model. In other words $\Gamma$ cannot have a model if it contains two contradictory formulas. ↩︎

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2 comment threads

Answer to first question (8 comments)
This looks like a compactness theorem, not a completeness theorem. (2 comments)
Answer to first question
Derek Elkins‭ wrote 3 days ago

To answer the question in your first footnote (which seems to be missing some words, but I believe the intent is clear enough): The statement says what it says, which is that each finite subset has a model. There is no assumption that there is one model that will work for every finite subset, though the conclusion implies this. That said, given two finite subsets, their union is finite and, thus, by this assumption, is required to have a model as well. So even if there exist two conflicting models of these two finite subsets, there must also be a self-consistent model of their union too. So the question is whether an infinite set of axioms could exclude particular models which are not excluded by any finite subset of the axioms.

kouty ‭ wrote 3 days ago · edited 3 days ago

Derek Elkins‭ . Thirst, I am very grateful to you for receiving this answer. I'll try to translate your answer in 'Truth Table speaking ' : If there are two finite subsets $\Gamma'$ and $\Gamma''$ such that everyone has as model, respectively the line 1 and the line 2 of the Table, how can we find a line corresponding to both?

kouty ‭ wrote 3 days ago

I was thinking that with an alternation maybe something representing line 1 or line 2, but I how/if it's possible.

kouty ‭ wrote 3 days ago · edited 2 days ago

OK , it's now clear that because of the union of two subsets wouldn't have a model If they have contradictory models, we can aggregate only such subsets they have non contradictory models. However if $ \Gamma $ have two 'contradictory subsets', each of them having a model, the theorem fails to apply. @Derek Helkins

kouty ‭ wrote 2 days ago · edited 2 days ago

OK I got a part of the proof. This paper is written clearer. When there is a subset Gamma ' for which Phi does not give a line in the Truth Table such that every formulas of Gamma' are true, there is nothing to do, simply. The proof of de Swart is misleading.

We're unioning sets of axioms, not combining models. Having two models that give different assignments to propositional variables (which is what I meant by "conflicting") doesn't mean that there's a contradiction. Even for the same set of axioms we can have multiple models, e.g. there are at least three models of $A\lor B$. As a separate example, $A=1, B=0$ is a model of ${A}$ and $A=0, B=1$ is a model of ${B}$, but that doesn't mean ${A,B}$ doesn't have a model. Obviously it does with $A=1, B=1$.

While those lecture notes are definitely much clearer than the proof you quoted (which isn't surprising to me because they are written by a computer scientist), the quoted proof is not misleading. Its biggest flaw (of presentation) is the "stateful" way it works with $i$. It would be clearer to do as the lecture notes do and talk about a sequence of partial assignments. While the presentation is poor, the actual approach in the quoted proof is fairly elegant.

kouty ‭ wrote 1 day ago

Derek Elkins‭ Thanks so much. But for me it's still hard to get. From the multiple models, at least one need to be common for all formulas, right?

kouty ‭ wrote 1 day ago

Derek Elkins‭ You wrote We're unioning sets of axioms. I was aware of this. From the enunciation of the Theorem I was understanding that formulas are not necessarily axioms and theorems but formulas that are simply not Self Contradictory, I mean, that are satisfied in at least one combination of atomic formulas.